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	Abstract 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays a crucial role in 
enabling developing economies to embark on a path of 
inclusive growth. This applies in par6cular if local 
subsidiaries of mul6na6onal enterprises (MNEs) are 
commibed to ‘principled embeddedness’ meaning that 
they are prepared to integrate parts of the local economy 
into global value chains by enabling them to comply with 
the required quality norms and standards. It also results 
in capacity development and technology transfer that is 
likely to beneﬁt local entrepreneurs who contribute to the 
diversity of markets in the domes6c economy. The 
empirically validated contribu6on of embedded 
subsidiaries of MNEs to inclusive growth challenge the 
norma6ve view that FDI in developing economies would 
merely pose a threat to exis6ng embedded economic 
systems. 
1.  Introduc6on 
In his seminal book ‘The Great Transforma6on’ Karl 
Polanyi (1944) calls the expansion of formal global 
markets a ‘satanic mill’ that would disembed local 
communi6es and their informal economies with fatal 
consequences for the local people and the 
environment. His gloomy view is shared by the Nobel 
Prize-winning economist Joseph S6glitz, who wrote 
the foreword to the 2001 edi6on of Polanyi’s 
masterpiece. 
Moreover, even the more pragma6c literature on 
embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1982, Ruggie 2008, 
Rodrik 2011) and global corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (Scherrer et al. 2006) seem to 
implicitly endorse Polanyi’s claims by focusing their 
aben6on on the poten6al damage caused by 
mul6na6onal enterprises (MNE) as forces of 
‘disembeddedness’ of local economic structures. 
These forces, so they argue, would ask for public and 
private ini6a6ves to ‘re-embed’ the aﬀected 
communi6es through the expansion of the na6onal 
welfare state and global CSR ini6a6ves, respec6vely. 
More recent empirical research in economic history 
(North 1977, Bang 2016), economic sociology 
(Granoveber 1985, Beckert 2007), and industrial 
policy (Uzzi 1996, Meyer et l. 2011) largely disqualify 
Polanyi’s assump6on that the modern formal 
economy lacks embeddedness in society. Aher all, no 
economy is detached from individuals and their 
societal networks that are primarily concerned with 
addressing coordina6on problems in daily business 
transac6ons. Therefore, MNE with long-term 
interests as foreign direct investors in less developed 
countries encourage their subsidiaries to strengthen 
their local economic and social networks. As such, 
subsidiaries support local business partners in their 
eﬀorts to become integrated into their respec6ve 
global value chain (GVC) through the compliance 
with industrial principles, standards, and norms. 
This MNE strategy of ‘principled embeddedness’ 
eventually contributes to growth and job crea6on in 
the local economy and, simultaneously, enables local 
business partners to beber cope with the 
sustainability challenges related to climate change, 
popula6on growth, and increasing aﬄuence. In this 
context, this paper argues that the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP)1 
should recognize that corporate responsibility 
cannot be limited to a principle of doing ‘no harm’. 
MNE that beneﬁt the region in which they operate 
should also be awarded for doing ‘good’ not because 
they want to be good corporate ci6zens but because 
it is in their long-term interest to also contribute to 
the ﬂourishing of the local economy in which they 
invest. The ISO 26000 Standard on Social 
Responsibility2 tends to acknowledge the value of 
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corporate embeddedness indirectly through its 
priority area ‘community involvement and 
development’. But its content remains vague when it 
comes to capturing its value concretely, and it tends 
to conceive the priority area as a moral duty rather 
than being in the long-term strategic interest of the 
company. 
In this paper we illustrate the embeddedness 
challenge that MNE face when inves6ng in 
developing economies by referring to the three 
major coordina6on problems that every company is 
confronted with when inves6ng abroad: the 
coordina6on problem of value that is not just about 
the price determined by demand and supply but also 
the challenge of fair compensa6on with regard to 
products that have public good character (life-saving 
drugs, technologies that boost agricultural 
produc6vity, and food quality), the coordina6on 
problem of compe66on that emerges from the 
reluctance of market par6cipants to be exposed to 
perfect compe66on, and the problem of coopera6on 
that emerges from the need for pre-compe66ve 
collabora6on and the build-up of social trust. These 
coordina6on problems, as originally outlined by the 
sociologist Jens Beckert (2007), can be most 
eﬀec6vely addressed by a foreign direct investment 
through a strategy of principled embeddedness. 
We illustrate this commitment to ‘principled 
embeddedness’ using concrete brief case studies. 
They are not meant to praise the selected MNE for 
all their business prac6ces. Aher all poten6al 
opportuni6es for opportunism in large companies 
are widespread despite increasing expenses on 
compliance issues and due diligence processes. But, 
these examples of embeddedness of MNEs show 
their poten6al to enable local economic 
empowerment and sustainable change in developing 
regions that are characterized by a high degree of 
economic and poli6cal uncertainty. 
2.  New Economic Sociology and re-deﬁni6on of the 
term ‘embeddedness’ 
The term ‘embeddedness’ has been shaped and re-
shaped by the research of economic sociologists in 
the 20th century. 
Karl Polanyi ini6ated the academic debate on 
embeddedness with the publica6on of ‘The Great 
Transforma6on’ in 1944. His basic argument was that 
the ins6tu6ons of embedded tradi6onal economies 
are being destroyed by a self-regula6ng market 
economy in which the market no longer serves the 
needs of the people but rather the reverse, that 
people would have to meet the needs of the market. 
As a consequence, the expansion of the formal 
market economy would lead to the disembedding of 
local economies with ‘catastrophic consequences’ for 
local communi6es. 
Polanyi’s view is also associated with the term 
‘substan6visim’ in economic anthropology. It 
dis6nguishes the substan6vist ‘embedded’ economy 
that is focused on self-suﬃciency, from the formalist 
‘disembedded’ economy that thrives on the ra6onal 
pursuit of proﬁt but would have no social roots. It 
presupposes an autonomous formal economy 
without social content; an assump6on commonly 
found also in the formal theory of neoclassical 
economics (Gemici 2008). 
Polanyi ’s dual is6c and norma6ve view of 
embeddedness was eventually challenged by a new 
genera6on of economic sociologists toward the end 
of the Cold War period. They cri6cized his 
assump6on that embeddedness would be mostly 
limited to economic ac6vi6es in premarket socie6es 
that were ﬁrmly embedded in social rela6ons. The 
assump6on that such embeddedness would no 
longer maber in modern economies since 
commercial transac6ons have ceased to be guided 
by social and kinship obliga6ons seemed increasingly 
unrealis6c given new empirical research on 
embeddedness in modern economies (Granoveber 
1985, Biggart and Beamish 2003, De Bakker et al. 
2013). It uncovered the embeddedness in the form 
of social networks, online and oﬄine, that provide 
the very basis for formal business rela6ons on the 
local as well as the global level. 
The term ‘embeddedness’ was no longer applied to 
dis6nguish between substan6vist (embedded) and 
formalist (disembedded) economic models. Instead, 
it was used to deﬁne the concrete, ongoing systems 
of social rela6ons that underpin economic ac6on 
(Granoveber 1985). Mark Granoveber, the 
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sociologist who played a crucial role in re-deﬁning 
the term ‘embeddedness’, started with a general 
cri6cism of over- and undersocialized concep6ons of 
human ac6on in sociology and economics. While the 
oversocialized concep6on in sociology mainly saw 
societal norms and values, internalized through 
socializa6on, as explanatory factors of human 
interac6on, neoclassical economics started from a 
undersocial ized concep6on with its homo 
oeconomicus who has no age, is not embedded in 
any social structure and completely independent of 
social rela6ons in economic decision-making. 
According to Granoveber, actors do not behave or 
decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they 
act exclusively according to prescribed roles that 
reﬂect certain moral norms and values. Instead, it is 
the social rela6ons rather than merely ins6tu6onal 
arrangements or a ‘generalized morality’ that are 
mainly responsible for a low degree of fraud and 
malfeasance and the produc6on of trust in economic 
life. His embeddedness approach concretely follows 
and analyzes paberns of social rela6ons to explain 
how socie6es overcome the problem of trust and 
disorder in economic life. It makes no predic6ons of 
universal order or disorder but rather assumes that 
the details of social structure will determine it 
(Granoveber and Swedberg 2001). 
2.1   The moral dimension of entrepreneurship 
Granoveber is in line with the argument of the 
economist Albert O. Hirschman who showed that the 
pursuit of economic self-interest in the formal 
market economy has hardly ever been based on 
reckless u6lity-maximizing antudes designed to 
merely realize short-term material preferences. 
Instead, human behavior in formal markets is 
characterized by civilized and gentle human 
interac6ons based on meta preferences that are also 
related to cultural upbringing and social rela6ons 
(Hirschman 1992). In addi6on, each economic actor 
faces the risk of reputa6on loss if she fails to play by 
the unwriben rules of fair interac6on. In this context, 
Hirschman refers to the so-called ‘doux-commerce’ 
hypothesis as suggested by well-known philosophers 
of the age of enlightenment such as Montesquieu 
and Condorcet. It basically argues that people 
involved in supraregional formal markets would 
develop more civilized manners in dealing with each 
other and acquire a more pronounced sense of 
fairness and reciprocity. Something that has recently 
also been conﬁrmed in empirical and experimental 
research in the ﬁeld of behavioral economics. 
Henrich (2006) showed for example that the more 
local communi6es are involved in supraregional 
trade, the more developed their sense of fairness 
and reciprocity. 
By focusing on micro- rather than the macro-
founda6ons of the concept of embeddedness, 
Granoveber leaves Polanyi’s norma6ve macro-
narra6ve unchallenged. In this context, Beckert 
(2007) proposes to revisit Polanyi’s work and starts 
instead from its basic insight that, ul6mately, it is the 
embeddedness of economic exchange that makes 
economic and social integra6on possible. The 
challenge is then to iden6fy the socioeconomic 
precondi6ons that allow economic prosperity to be 
combined with the realiza6on of a humane social 
and poli6cal order. 
2.2  Embeddedness as a way to address three major 
coordina6on problems in the economy 
The reduc6on of uncertainty is an indispensable 
precondi6on for the emergence and opera6on of 
market economies; and embeddedness of economic 
exchange in a web of social rela6ons helps to reduce 
this uncertainty and provides stability to market 
interac6ons. 
Re d u c i n g u n c e r ta i nt y t h ro u g h e n h a n c e d 
embeddedness can be addressed by managing three 
coordina6on problems eﬀec6vely, according to 
Beckert (1996): the problem of value, the problem of 
compe66on, and the problem of coopera6on. The 
problem of value is that the price of a product may 
reﬂect more than merely its current demand and 
supply because there is also the social context in 
which it is introduced for sale. The valua6on of the 
par6cular product is primarily social in character and 
as such generates preferences that are endogenous, 
not exogenous. This problem is most obvious when 
comparing the uncontroversial price-senng 
strategies of companies that operate in the market 
for consumer electronics or luxury goods and the 
highly controversial one in the ﬁeld of life-saving 
drugs or eﬀec6ve inputs in agriculture. Whereas no 
one bothers if the company ‘Apple’ asks for a higher 
price for its new smartphone, society may 
disapprove of companies that generate proﬁts with 
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the sale of products that should be accessible to the 
poor to save lives or prevent starva6on. If such 
products are not accessible to those in desperate 
need because they cannot aﬀord to pay its price, it 
becomes a moral issue for society. At the same 6me, 
such products would not exist in the ﬁrst place if 
companies would not have developed them in the 
hope of crea6ng a proﬁt that is at least able to 
reimburse the ﬁxed costs invested in R&D and the 
regulatory approval process. So whereas the price of 
a smartphone is mainly based on quality markers 
inﬂuenced not just by adver6sing but also 
ins6tu6ons and plaporms that discuss the merit and 
thus the value of the product, the social process of 
valua6on of products that are generally associated 
with public goods, such as life-saving medicine (no 
one should be excluded, its consump6on should be 
non-rival), show that the embeddedness of 
economic ac6on makes it necessary to nego6ate 
prices in ways that make them socially acceptable. 
Ohen corpora6ons do so on their own through a 
strategy of price diﬀeren6a6on (Ridley 2006), but 
they are also confronted with many more 
government interven6ons than in markets for 
personal accessories due to public concerns about 
accessibility to public health and food security (Aerni 
2015a, 2015b). 
The coordina6on problem of compe66on relates to 
the fact that ‘perfect compe66on’ may be neither in 
the interest of business nor the interest of society as 
a whole. While companies do not like to enter 
markets of perfect compe66on in which they can 
only expect decreasing returns, society as a whole 
disapproves of cubhroat compe66on where survival 
in the market depends primarily on cost-saving 
measures, ohen at the expense of the quality of the 
product, worker safety, and environmental 
protec6on. Simultaneously, markets of perfect 
compe66on do not generate innova6on. Inves6ng in 
innova6on requires a company to have assets 
generated from previous rent- or proﬁt-seeking 
ac6vi6es. Moreover, a company would only invest in 
innova6on if there is a prospect to generate a proﬁt 
through a temporary monopoly in which the 
company has price-senng power (Romer 1994). This 
explains why markets of perfect compe66on are 
mostly a temporary phenomenon that is eventually 
undermined by three forces: lobbying by market 
incumbents for regula6on that prevents market 
entry of new compe6tors; labor, environmental, and 
consumer pressure groups that advocate for 
regula6ons that make it more diﬃcult to save costs 
at the expense of society and the environment; and, 
ﬁnally, start-up companies that want to grow 
through innova6on. The laber ask governments to 
create an ins6tu6onal senng that rewards them for 
the risk of inves6ng in something new. The 
protec6on of intellectual property rights (IPR) is one, 
but by far not the only way to enable innova6ve 
companies to have a temporary monopoly that 
allows them to generate proﬁts that cover the prior 
R&D costs and to further invest in the con6nuous 
improvement of the product. In other words, 
regula6on of perfect compe66on is primarily 
designed to discourage cubhroat compe66on. But 
the resul6ng crea6on of isola6ng mechanisms that 
shield incumbents from more compe66on can also 
harm long-term societal interests, especially in the 
case of monopolies that are likely to be permanent 
thanks to government protec6on and thus also 
unrelated to innova6on. As a consequence, the 
economy becomes less capable of renewing itself 
because the established monopolies become 
professional rent-seeking insiders that beneﬁt from 
collusion and the exclusion of more compe66ve 
actors (Olson 1982). Therefore, regula6ons also have 
the added purpose of giving incen6ves to outsiders 
to create new markets by taking the risk of inves6ng 
in new products and services that generate 
increasing returns (Romer 1994, Aerni 2015b). 
The coordina6on problem of coopera6on arises from 
the asymmetric informa6on between exchange 
partners, e.g. the agent (manager) of a company is 
more familiar with the business than the principal 
(investor), and the seller of a product knows more 
about the product quality than the buyer. As a 
consequence, the agent may have an incen6ve to 
use this informa6on advantage at the expense of the 
principal (Akerlof 1970, Aerni 2006). Social networks 
in general and trusted ethnic and kinship networks in 
par6cular are a way to lower uncertainty and thus 
transac6on costs by crea6ng informal but binding 
rules and norms for transac6ons that are eﬀec6vely 
enforced through the threat of exclusion (Olson 
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1965, Hindmoor 1998, Lyon 2000). They mostly 
emerge where the formal rules have been ar6ﬁcially 
imposed from outside and are not adequately 
enforced (Henrich 2011). In addi6on, coordina6on 
problems may also be resolved on a private basis 
through coordina6on eﬀorts that go beyond 6ght-
knit social networks. For example, before the spread 
of public standards for food safety in the 20th 
century, it was the food industry in 19th century 
Europe and the USA that designed and eﬀec6vely 
implemented private food safety standards in the 
form of pre-compe66ve collabora6on (Ping 2011, 
Freidberg 2009). The reason why all par6es in 
industry were prepared to be inspected by a third 
party was the fact that deceiving the consumer, for 
example with diluted milk or false weight 
measurements, did not just aﬀect the business of 
the cheater but led to a loss of trust in the whole 
industry. The resul6ng systems of reputa6on helped 
to overcome the problem of asymmetric 
informa6on. When private standards eventually 
became interna6onal public standards through the 
crea6on of the Interna6onal Organiza6on for 
Standardiza6on (ISO) and UN regulatory ins6tu6ons, 
they could be eﬀec6vely enforced only in countries 
where the coordina6on problem of coopera6on in 
the private sector has previously been addressed 
eﬀec6vely by private standards (Aerni 2013). 
Finally, Beckert considers social legi6ma6on a 
precondi6on for the emergence of stable markets. 
The deﬁni6on of what is legal and what is illegal to 
buy and sell is determined by society and its norms 
and values rather than the economic actors (Jacobs 
1970). However, norms and values change over 6me 
and with it the deﬁni6on of legal and illegal 
transac6ons (Appiah 2011). Even though illegal 
markets may work similarly to legal markets, the way 
the coordina6on problem of coopera6on is 
addressed is diﬀerent. It is of existen6al importance 
to the illegal networks; if one party defects under the 
promise of impunity, the whole illegal business 
network may be dissolved and its members end up 
in pr i son. Th is a l so exp la ins the st rong 
embeddedness of economic ac6vi6es in kinship-
based illegal networks such as the Maﬁa (Gambeba 
1996). So embeddedness may not always be 
desirable if the underlying norms and values of the 
respec6ve network are not beneﬁcial but harmful for 
society as a whole. This also applies to embedded 
economic systems with high transac6on costs due to 
widespread corrup6on (De Sardan 1999). 
Beckert concludes that the coordina6on problems 
point to the fundamental uncertainty that economic 
actors face in everyday economic interac6ons. As 
context-speciﬁc challenges they are a sort of blind 
spot of orthodox economic models and highlight the 
fact that the embeddedness of the economy may be 
a precondi6on for its func6oning (Beckert 1996). 
2.3   Embeddedness in the context of economic 
complexity 
Recent research in economic complexity (Hidalgo 
2015) largely conﬁrms this view by poin6ng to the 
costs of establishing links to build purpose-oriented 
social networks designed to address context-speciﬁc 
coordina6on problems in long-term global 
collabora6ve networks of ﬁrms to adopt or even 
create innova6on in global value chains (GVCs). 
These links are highly speciﬁc and recurrent and 
exact outcomes are not known in advance. They 
involve individuals and ﬁrms that must be 
understood as packages of specialized knowledge 
and know-how nested in a social structure that 
supports them. Such global networks designed to 
create a stream of revenue out of economic 
interac6on are challenging to maintain because they 
are evolving and with it the knowledge and know-
how they embody. Accumula6ng knowledge and 
know-how is diﬃcult because crea6ng the networks 
required to embody them is diﬃcult. If they succeed 
in achieving their purpose and become economically 
successful, it is less because of standardiza6on and 
technological change that decrease the costs of 
crea6ng formal network links but because they are 
embedded in pre-exis6ng cultural and social 
networks that are based on social capital, the trust 
among actors involved that is required to embark 
ini6ally on informal rather than formal collabora6on. 
S ince los ing trust has ser ious long-term 
consequences for the one who commibed a breach 
of trust, this non-contractual form of collabora6on is 
very eﬀec6ve in deterring fraud and malfeasance 
(Shapiro 1987, Molina-Morales 2010). At the same 
6me, it works without the burden of lengthy legal 
documenta6on and costly enforcement procedures 
and as such makes it worthwhile to embark on risky 
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joint commercial projects. This also explains why 
most employers are keen on hiring referrals because 
it is easier to trust someone with whom you share a 
friend (Granoveber 1995). Understanding how 
complex and purpose-oriented global networks work 
requires combined knowledge in transac6on cost 
theory, which deals mostly with formal network links, 
and economic sociology, which looks at informal 6es 
(Hidalgo 2015). The economic eﬀects of preexis6ng 
social networks are important to understand the 
costs of links in context. 
3.  Economic globaliza6on as a force of 
‘disembeddedness’ 
As the main drivers of economic globaliza6on, MNEs 
are crucial in addressing coordina6on problems in 
GVCs by tapping the knowledge and know-how of 
their embedded internal and external networks to 
generate economic outcomes that ensure a 
con6nuous stream of revenue through scalable 
innova6on (Andersson et al. 2002). Yet, in public, 
they have not been associated with embedded 
economic structures but actually more with the risk 
of ‘disembeddeding’ local tradi6onal economies 
(Robinson 2014, Baker 2016). 
MNE may indeed be a major force of economic 
globaliza6on that has induced many locally 
embedded tradi6onal industries to either transform 
or disappear. But this pressure on local economies 
started already in the 19th century in Europe, when 
the landlords of the feudalist system tried to 
compete in the new trade-oriented market economy 
not by introducing new forms of division of labor and 
technological innova6on but by merely squeezing 
out more work obliga6ons from their dependents 
(Braudel 1982). As a consequence, the old manorial 
system3 faced a crisis in the form of massive escape. 
Peasants and servants were no longer willing to work 
merely for the beneﬁt of their rent-seeking landlords 
because they had an opportunity to exit. They 
migrated to nearby expanding urban areas or 
overseas. This enabled them to take their des6ny 
into their own hands. A risky and uncertain venture 
that eventually allowed them to unshackle the old 
febers associated with tradi6onal feudal economic 
systems and ﬂourish in arrival ci6es (Saunders 2011). 
Therefore, the ﬁrst wave of globaliza6on may have 
disembedded the old manorial system, but it also 
created many economic opportuni6es for the 
outsiders in society, those who had no economic 
rights under the old rule (Aerni 2016). 
3.1  Why disembedding tradi6onal structures may 
help outsiders – with long-term beneﬁt for society 
The great migra6on of the underprivileged to new 
places with beber economic opportuni6es 
jumpstarted a process of social mobility that forced 
the previously unchallenged aristocrats to deal on 
equal terms with entrepreneurial upstarts that 
emerged from the former peasant and servant class. 
Ohen the laber did not compete directly with the 
former who invested primarily in established capital-
intensive industries but created en6rely new markets 
addressing old needs in a new way (Etzkowitz 2004, 
Aerni 2007). All these new markets had to resolve 
Beckert’s three primary coordina6on problems of 
embedded economies: the determina6on of the 
value of the new product, the securing of proﬁt 
through an acceptable departure from perfect 
compe66on, and the ease of coopera6ng with other 
stakeholders on issues of common interest. Thanks 
to their ability to limit fraud and malfeasance in their 
prac6ce through eﬀec6vely addressing the 
coordina6on problem of coopera6on, these new 
economic actors created the necessary social capital 
to gain a public license to operate in new and ohen 
untested ﬁelds of business (Cope et al. 2007, Aerni 
2016). Their success in crea6ng and scaling new 
markets allowed many of these upstarts to 
eventually grow into global corpora6ons. 
However, as the landed gentry before them, many 
emerging large corpora6ons may have used their 
large proﬁts, ini6ally generated through innova6on, 
to imitate the lavish lifestyle of the aristocrats and 
secure unproduc6ve rents through real estate 
investments and poli6cal lobbying to keep 
compe66on at bay (Schluep and Aerni 2016). 
Moreover, if their untested technological innova6ons 
caused accidents, they refused to be liable or 
assume responsibility for the damage (Ice 1991). As 
such, they indeed may have caused the 
disembedding of tradi6onal socie6es without 
oﬀering any posi6ve alterna6ve to the originally very 
repressive system. In this context, Karl Polanyi (1944) 
rightly refers to the growing anger of the public 
toward reckless corporate behavior and how it 
eventually led to counter-reforms that improved 
social security and health coverage for the employed 
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and helped create social safety nets for those who 
lost their employment or were unable to work in the 
ﬁrst place. But this view fatally implies that 
disembeddedness merely happens through ‘bad’ 
private sector investment while re-embeddedness 
takes place exclusively through ‘good’ government 
interven6on designed to repair the damage caused 
by the private sector. 
This implicit view is also very much present in the 
assump6on in embedded liberalism (Rodrik 2011) 
that opening up markets to interna6onal trade has to 
be accompanied by the expansion of the welfare 
state, as a sort of loser compensa6on, to obtain the 
approval of the voters in a democra6c system. Even 
though it is indeed true that the private sector may 
not be able to provide for public goods, the public 
sector is only in a posi6on to provide for important 
public goods if it is able to raise suﬃcient taxes from 
successful private sector ac6vi6es (Desai 2003). 
Moreover, a government that distributes public 
resources only to those loyal to them, as it happens 
in tradi6onal patron-client systems, will also fail to 
provide public goods even if the funds are available. 
Finally, many of the knowledge-based private sector 
innova6ons eventually end in the public realm and 
thus assume the character of a classical public good 
being non-rival and non-excludable. Therefore, the 
provision of public goods by governments should 
generally not be understood as correc6on for the 
damage done by private sector ac6vi6es but as a 
result of the emergence of a formal, tax-paying 
private sector that also contributes to the eﬀec6ve 
management of public goods through its 
competences in the provision of client-oriented 
products and services (Aerni 2015b). 
3.2  Disembedding post-colonial structures 
The social and economic transforma6on through 
economic globaliza6on in Europe in the 19th century 
is to some extent comparable to the transforma6on 
of developing economies in the 21st century. Foreign 
direct investments (FDI) by MNE in these countries 
are challenging and some6mes disembedding the 
prevailing tradi6onal rent-seeking economies 
inherited from colonial 6mes that have many 
similari6es with the feudalist economies of the 
Ancien Régime in Europe. Colonial powers were 
rarely interested in disrup6ng exis6ng economic and 
poli6cal systems in the countries they colonized. 
Instead, they preferred to collaborate with the 
respec6ve local elite based on the Polanyi’s 
principles of reciprocity, redistribu6on, and autarky 
(Polanyi 1944) that prevailed in the tradi6onal 
embedded economy (Aerni 2007). The system of 
patronage s6ll prevailed in postcolonial 6mes. During 
the Cold War period, the feudalist economies in 
developing countries tended to become client states 
either of the United States or the Soviet Union. Both 
powers endowed the new indigenous leaders of the 
European ex-colonies in Africa with almost dictatorial 
powers and secured their rule with military support, 
as long as they remained loyal to either the market-
oriented system propagated by the United States or 
the communist system propagated by the Soviet 
Union (McCormick 1995, Zubok 2009). 
With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, such systems of patronage lost their 
purpose and faced growing cri6cism from within and 
without the developing world. Moreover, the 
economic rise of Asia illustrated that developing 
countries are not entrapped in an exploita6ve global 
economic system in which they merely serve as 
suppliers of raw materials. Countries like South 
Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and later China may have 
resented poli6cal interference of Western powers, 
but they very much realized the value of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) from the West. Aher all, if 
Western mul6na6onal corpora6ons ﬁnd it abrac6ve 
to invest in their countries under the condi6on that 
they become par6ally embedded into their 
tradi6onal economies (e.g. through joint ventures in 
special economic zones), this will enable the transfer 
of important know-how and technology that helps to 
upgrade their domes6c economies to a level that will 
eventually enable the local export-oriented industry 
to compete with the established economies of the 
West (Yingming 2009). The ins6tu6onal reforms 
required to abract long-term foreign direct 
investments led to unprecedented catch-up growth 
(Aerni 2011a) and the emergence of an 
entrepreneurial middle class that makes use of its 
economic empowerment to lobby also for poli6cal 
reforms that are more conducive to their economic 
interests (Woetzel 1989). 
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Catch up growth rates today are much higher than 
they used to be in earlier 6mes since so much more 
goods and services, know-how, technology, and 
ﬁnancial ins6tu6ons are in existence today that could 
quickly transform a tradi6onal rent-seeking economy 
(Romer 2010) provided that the respec6ve 
governments are willing to create an ins6tu6onal 
senng that is conducive to such a process of 
transforma6on. 
Alas, governments hardly ever do so unless there is 
pressure from the domes6c entrepreneurial middle 
class to carry out the necessary economic reforms. 
Since this middle class does not exist in tradi6onal 
feudalist economies with patron-client systems, 
governments prefer to secure their rents by 
addressing the preferences of the powerful landlords 
and tradi6onal leaders who, in return, ensure their 
re-elec6on (Aerni 2006). As patrons, they ask their 
dependents or clients to vote for the ruling party in 
exchange for protec6on of their material interests 
and improved access to scarce government 
resources (Berman 1998). 
3.3   The failure of foreign aid to empower local 
entrepreneurs through economic integra6on 
At the same 6me, foreign aid contribu6ons 
cons6tute a signiﬁcant share of government 
resources in the feudalist economies in developing 
countries. Foreign development agencies are 
primarily focused on addressing the preferences of 
the taxpayers and donors of the country that 
sponsors their ac6vi6es. The preferences of people 
in aﬄuent economies are, however, similar to the 
preferences of the aristocrats of Europe in the 19th 
century (Aerni 2006). They increasingly resent 
economic globaliza6on because it challenges their 
economic and poli6cal supremacy and as a result, 
they prefer to support projects that protect 
tradi6onal communi6es from the forces of economic 
globaliza6on rather than enable their economic 
integra6on. Ignoring the demands of reformist forces 
makes foreign donors ohen part of the problem 
since it leads to a total neglect of the needs of the 
educated and entrepreneurial outsiders in the 
domes6c economy who do not see a future in their 
embedded rent-seeking economy and seek a beber 
life in the growing ci6es or abroad. 
There may be some 6mid ini6a6ves to promote 
entrepreneurial rights, but they are primarily focused 
on improving livelihoods in the informal sector4. 
Such eﬀorts have lible impact on the overall 
economic situa6on, employment, and economic 
opportuni6es because opera6ng in the informal 
economy does not allow an entrepreneur to grow 
and formally employ people, as Arthur Lewis, an 
interdisciplinary social science scholar and Nobel 
Prize winning development economist, already 
no6ced in 1955 (Lewis 1955). Why? Because only 
formally registered businesses that comply with 
standards and regula6on and have a customer base 
beyond their neighborhoods abract investment and 
would eventually allow entrepreneurs to generate 
increasing returns and jobs in the formal sector 
(Aerni 2015b). 
3.4  Recognizing the contribu6on of MNE 
subsidiaries to local economic empowerment 
Enabling informal businesses to succeed as growth-
oriented formally registered companies requires 
competent assistance, which is found in the private 
sector rather than government or civil society (Aerni 
et al. 2015). However, unlike donor agencies and 
NGOs, companies invest in local businesses only if 
they are conﬁdent that the business will eventually 
succeed. In other words, an investment must pay oﬀ, 
and in case it pays oﬀ, it will not just beneﬁt the 
respec6ve local business and its investor but the 
region as a whole through its contribu6on to 
endogenous (homegrown) economic development. 
In this context, subsidiaries of MNE that are 
commibed to local embeddedness have the 
poten6al to signiﬁcantly contribute to sustainable 
change in the region in which they invest. This 
requires, however, that governments and civil society 
groups do not undercut business opportuni6es by 
already providing goods and services for free. This 
crowding out of private sector investments tends to 
be especially prominent in regions that are iden6ﬁed 
as ‘vulnerable’ (Farla et al. 2016, Ciaian et al. 2012) 
 10
ATDF JOURNAL  VOLUME 9, ISSUE 1 2017
3.5   Coping with business coordina6on problems 
through a strategy of ‘principled embeddedness’ 
A co r p o rate co m m i t m e nt to ‘ p r i n c i p l e d 
embeddedness’ is essen6ally designed to jointly 
address the coordina6on problems of the market 
with local stakeholders responsibly. In this context, 
MNE from developed countries inves6ng in 
developing economies realize that they have to 
abide by the global industry guiding principles, even 
if domes6c regula6on and weak legal enforcement 
power in host countries may allow them to ignore 
such with impunity. MNE are commibed to 
principled embeddedness, not because of a 
norma6ve ethical stance, but because it is in their 
enlightened self-interest to be perceived as a fair 
player in business and society, independent of the 
loca6on in which they operate. At the same 6me, 
MNEs know that they do not operate in a vacuum. 
The local stakeholders in the region in which they 
invest will eventually raise the ques6on to what 
extent the presence of the MNE also beneﬁts the 
local economy as well as local society and the 
environment. If the MNE turns out to be a mere 
economic oﬀ-shore island of their country of origin 
that has no links to the local economy and no social 
impact in the region whatsoever, na6onalist 
poli6cians may eventually want them to lose their 
license to operate or force them into compliance 
with rather rigid local content requirements or joint-
ventures that may make lible sense from a business 
point of view. So, no maber if they pay their taxes in 
the country in which they operate and comply with 
interna6onal business and human rights standards, 
they will have a local acceptance problem if 
perceived as genera6ng proﬁts for stakeholders 
abroad while shunning any interac6on that might 
beneﬁt the local economy and society (Schluep 
2017). 
Therefore, MNE with a long-term view are also 
prepared to nego6ate with local stakeholders on 
how to integrate qualiﬁed local business partners 
into their global supply chains, invest in local 
capacity development and training programs to 
recruit more skilled local employees (to help upgrade 
informal business ac6vi6es to a level where local 
businesses are able to comply with interna6onal 
standards and compete in the formal economy) and 
to sell a higher share of their goods locally. Such a 
commitment to ‘principled embeddedness’ helps the 
MNE to earn long-term social capital on a na6onal as 
well as the interna6onal level. 
4.   The role of subsidiaries of MNE in developing 
countries 
So far, this paper has portrayed MNEs as a 
homogenous en6ty located in wealthy OECD 
countries and inves6ng in poorer non-OECD 
countries. This is misleading insofar as many of the 
globally expanding MNE originate from emerging 
economies rather than developed economies. MNEs 
from emerging economies tend to be encouraged by 
their governments to invest in the developing world. 
Instead of being monitored and eventually shamed 
for inves6ng in ‘high-risk’ developing economies, as 
it is ohen the case in OECD countries, MNE from 
emerging economies even obtain ac6ve support 
from their governments in bidding processes for 
public procurement in less developed countries, for 
example through pre-ﬁnancing agreements. 
The portrayal of MNE is also misleading in the sense 
that they are not a homogenous en6ty. Their local 
subsidiaries ohen enjoy a substan6al amount of 
autonomy, and frequently, they are as much involved 
with local stakeholders (external embeddedness) 
than their parent company (internal embeddedness) 
– which, depending on the industry and country 
context, may ul6mately also beneﬁt the parent 
company. 
This double or mul6ple embeddedness (Meyer et al. 
2011) exposes the subsidiary to internal and external 
ins6tu6onal pressures: MNE that adapt their 
strategies and organiza6onal prac6ces to the local 
contexts are subject to constraints imposed by the 
available resources as well as ins6tu6onal constraints 
imposed by their country of origin. If subsidiaries 
manage to combine external and internal resources 
successfully, they become centers of excellence on 
their own and as such may beneﬁt the host country 
through their knowledge base and their 
commitment to sustainability and to collabora6on 
with domes6c business to a great extent (Andersson 
and Forsgren 2000). 
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The new aben6on in academic literature on the 
important and increasingly autonomous role of 
subsidiaries in MNE has led to a growing skep6cism 
toward the former ‘center-periphery’ view, in which 
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages of the MNE are 
developed and controlled by the parent company, 
while the foreign subsidiaries merely exploit these 
advantages in the local markets. This may s6ll be the 
case at an early stage, when an MNE starts to 
explore opportuni6es to sell its products in another 
country. But once the MNE selects a country also as 
an important produc6on base, the importance and 
autonomy of the subsidiary increases and with it the 
pressure to enhance embeddedness in the country 
(Andersson and Forsgren 2000). Another cri6cal 
dimension of enhanced local embeddedness is 
related to the poten6al of the informa6on age to 
change the distribu6on of compe66ve advantages 
across diﬀerent categories of ﬁrms in global value 
chains (GVCs). Informa6on and communica6on 
technologies (ICTs) have facilitated the emergence of 
new manufacturing technologies and cost-saving 
logis6cs that led to the increasing engagement of a 
wider variety of actors, including small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries that 
would have previously been ignored due to high 
transac6on costs. Enhanced use of ICTs in GVCs also 
leads to advances in product modularity. They can 
act as a subs6tute for rela6onal governance, even 
when cultural diﬀerences among partners are high. 
In other words, fragmenta6on and modularity may 
make rela6onships among partner ﬁrms more 
immune to cultural diﬀerences (Alcácer et al. 2016). 
At the same 6me, they increase pressure to pursue a 
strategy of principled embeddedness in the host 
country because integra6ng local companies into 
global value chains requires them to adjust their 
business prac6ces to interna6onal standards. 
4.1   Selected cases of ‘principled embeddedness’ of 
subsidiaries of MNE 
Based on the ﬁeld research conducted by Master 
and PhD students in the CTI5 project on local 
embeddedness of mul6na6onal enterprises in 
developing countries6 and a panel discussion on the 
topic in a workshop on embeddedness in Zurich7, the 
posi6ve sustainability eﬀects resul6ng from 
embeddedness of Swiss-based mul6na6onals such 
as Chiquita, Nestlé, Syngenta (case studies) and Bata 
shoes (workshop presenta6on) were assessed. The 
ﬁeld research required the collabora6on with a local 
university to obtain external and independent 
assessments, in addi6on to the data provided by the 
company. Even though in each case, some 
shortcomings and challenges of the business of the 
respec6ve country subsidiaries were iden6ﬁed, a 
commitment to ‘principled embeddedness’ were 
recognized in all case studies. Independent of the 
failures and scandals that all these large MNEs may 
be confronted with in the course of their opera6ons 
in developing countries, it is worth poin6ng out what 
m a ke s t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t t o p r i n c i p l e d 
embeddedness valuable for the local communi6es 
and the environment: 
A ﬁrst example is Nestle Philippines. The Swiss-based 
company set up its ﬁrst subsidiary in the Philippines 
in 1911. In 1960, Nestlé S.A. and San Miguel 
Corpora6on entered into a partnership resul6ng in 
the forma6on of Nutri6onal Products, Inc. (Nutripro). 
In 1962, Nutripro’s ﬁrst factory started opera6ons in 
Alabang, Mun6nlupa to manufacture NESCAFÉ. In 
1977, Filipro, Inc. and Nutripro Inc. merged under 
the name Filipro, Inc. In 1986, Filipro, Inc. changed to 
its present name as Nestlé Philippines, Inc. In late 
1998, Nestlé Philippines became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Nestlé S.A., following the laber’s 
purchase of all of San Miguel Corpora6on’s equity 
shareholding in the company8. Today Nescafé 
Philippines is not just sourcing its coﬀee beans from 
the Philippines but also processes and sells most of 
its end products domes6cally. Moreover, most of its 
employees in senior posi6ons are Filipinos. As such 
the company is truly embedded in the local economy 
and perceived by most Filipinos as a Filipino-based 
company. Simultaneously Nestlé abides by its CSR 
standards and has even developed a NESCAFÉ Plan 
designed to ensure that coﬀee farmers grow viable, 
healthy crops, and that coﬀee farming remains 
sustainable. Together with the Rainforest Alliance, 
the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), and the 
Common Code for the Coﬀee Community (4C), the 
company makes sure it complies with interna6onally 
recognized sustainability standards. 
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The Swiss-based agribusiness ﬁrm Syngenta (recently 
acquired by the Chinese ﬁrm ChemChina) also 
illustrates the posi6ve impact of a self-interested 
commitment to embeddedness. The company has 
ohen been cri6cized by civil society ac6vists for 
being an agent of industrial agriculture that 
generates proﬁts at the expense of clueless small-
scale farmers in developing countries. The fact is, 
however, that an innova6on-driven agricultural 
company like Syngenta is unable to sell any products 
to such farmers unless they prove to beneﬁt the 
farmer family in terms of revenues and improved 
natural resource management. In this context, the 
company has an ac6ve interest to invest in those 
small-scale farmers in developing countries who are 
determined to move from subsistence-oriented to 
business-oriented agriculture. For that purpose, it 
has built up a global stewardship network in 
collabora6on with local NGOs that recognizes the 
poten6al of public-private partnerships for 
sustainable development9. The network aims at 
ensuring the safe applica6on of the oﬀered solu6on 
packages. Each year, Syngenta and its partners train 
around three million producers worldwide and help 
them to upgrade their agricultural produc6vity in a 
sustainable way. Growth-oriented small-scale 
farmers beneﬁt from Syngenta’s stewardship 
program by learning how to comply with the na6onal 
and interna6onal labor and environmental 
standards, and this allows them to eventually 
produce food for the growing urban popula6on 
worldwide while genera6ng the necessary revenues 
to invest in the future of their oﬀspring. 
A needs assessment conducted in 2013 with 
stakeholders involved in agricultural extension in 
tropical countries on capacity development for 
agricultural innova6on revealed that private sector 
capacity development is more appreciated by local 
farmers than public sector programs to enhance the 
capacity of farmers to innovate and become more 
produc6ve10. This is not surprising given the fact that 
companies are under much greater pressure to 
deliver value for farmers. They need to understand 
their context and come up with tailor-made 
solu6ons, whereas public sector oﬃcials may oﬀer 
services for free but they are less responsive to the 
actual needs of farmers and therefore less valuable 
to them (Aerni et al. 2015). 
The interna6onal company Bata illustrates how many 
beneﬁts MNE subsidiaries can create for the local 
people if they do not primarily focus on merely 
expor6ng their products to aﬄuent markets abroad 
but instead tailor them to the needs of the domes6c 
market. Bata ini6ally started in the Czech Republic 
but then quickly expanded into many other countries 
in the course of the 20 th century. For many decades, 
the company has run subsidiaries in several African 
countries where its shoes are primarily produced for 
the local market. As a result, most Africans who buy 
shoes buy Bata shoes because that is what they can 
aﬀord and what suits the local circumstances. 
Moreover, thousands of Africans were employed, 
housed, and trained in the business of shoemaking 
since Bata ﬁrst invested in Africa in the mid 20th 
century. As a consequence, Bata has earned the 
company an enormous amount of social capital 
because its shoes have generated considerable 
welfare eﬀects for the less privileged. 
Finally, the company Chiquita is an interes6ng case 
because it has a long history of embeddedness. The 
history of United Fruit Company, as the company 
was called before changing its name in the 1980s, 
was characterized by poli6cal rather than economic 
embeddedness. It played a crucial role during the 
Cold War period as a company that enjoyed the 
backing of the US government as well as the na6onal 
land-owning elites in La6n American countries that 
fought against communism. As a consequence, the 
company’s name became associated with client 
states that had more interest in serving US interests 
than the interests of its people. Chiquita was 
determined in the early 1990s to leave the past 
behind and embark on a fundamental corporate 
transforma6on. It decided to fundamentally change 
the mode of producing and expor6ng bananas in 
developing countries. As one of the very ﬁrst MNE, it 
asked its country subsidiaries to collaborate with the 
Rainforest Alliance (RA) to improve its social and 
environmental sustainability performance in the 
early 1990s. In 2000 all Chiquita-owned farms were 
RA cer6ﬁed, and by 2012 it upgraded 75% of its local 
suppliers to become compa6ble with the RA 
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standard. In this period, its subsidiaries started with 
a homeownership program for their employees, local 
nature and community projects such as ‘Nogal’ in 
Costa Rica together with the Swiss retailer Migros, 
the Mesoamerican Reef Project with WWF, and the 
Panama Biodiversity Project (‘San San’) with the 
German retailer REWE. 
In addi6on, the company con6nuously improved the 
strict implementa6on of sustainability prac6ces in 
banana cul6va6on and processing, reduced its 
carbon footprint (in collabora6on with the 
Massachusebs Ins6tute of Technology, MIT) as well 
as its water footprint in collabora6on with WWF 
Interna6onal. Its eﬀorts have been widely 
acknowledged by external reviews11 and reported in 
the Economist in 2012 under the 6tle ‘Going 
Bananas’ (because all these investments in 
sustainable change would not have paid oﬀ in terms 
of an improved reputa6on). Its commitment to local 
embeddedness has been documented by three 
master theses conducted in Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
and Panama at ETH Zurich in 2016. These theses 
were part of a project on the impact of local 
embeddedness of Swiss-based MNE on sustainability 
in developing countries12. The cri6cal ﬁeld research 
conducted by the students discovered many posi6ve 
side eﬀects for the local economy that resulted from 
the commitment of Chiquita subsidiaries to embed 
themselves into the domes6c economy. Ohen these 
side eﬀects were not documented in Chiquita’s 
sustainability report because they abributed them to 
the long-term business strategy rather than a 
concrete sustainability strategy. But the students also 
uncovered local challenges due to local ins6tu6onal 
and economic uncertain6es that the company may 
be able to address more eﬀec6vely. Despite the fact 
that Chiquita turned from a public into a private 
company in 2015 aher having been acquired by the 
Brazilian fruit juice producer Cutrale, Chiquita 
con6nued to s6ck to its progressive CSR strategy and 
remained open-minded to cri6cal issues that the 
students raised in their ﬁeld research. Many large 
retailers in Europe refuse to acknowledge Chiquita’s 
record as a pioneer in the ﬁeld of CSR and 
sustainability in banana produc6on (Schwab 2017). 
These retailers tend to point out that consumers s6ll 
do not associate Chiquita with sustainability. As a 
consequence, many large retailers prefer to 
exclusively sell Fairtrade and organic bananas to their 
consumers to signal their sustainability commitment 
(Aerni 2013). In addi6on Migros came up with its 
own model project of banana produc6on in 
collabora6on with WWF. However, Migros has yet to 
provide evidence of sustainability improvements it 
has abained that go beyond the performance 
achieved in collabora6on with Chiquita (Schwab 
2017). In fact, the so-called COSA study that 
compares the performance of diﬀerent sustainability 
standards in agriculture suggests that organic and 
Fairtrade have improved lible in performance 
compared to less known labels such as UTZ and the 
Rainforest Alliance13. The challenges of organic 
farming labels in developing countries are also 
documented in numerous publica6ons (Dragusanu 
et al. 2014, Ronald & Adamchak 2008, Paarlberg & 
Paarlberg 2008). What is especially odd in organic 
banana produc6on is the fact that water is 
considered a natural ingredient and therefore its use 
is unrestricted. This explains why organic banana 
produc6on is mostly found in rather arid zones 
because it relies heavily on irriga6on. The fairness of 
Fair Trade has been ques6oned by Fridell (2007). 
More recently, Clark & Hussey (2016) argued that 
describing fair trade as an eﬀort to re-embed the 
agricultural economy in the way Polanyi envisioned it 
is misleading. Stakeholders in the developed world 
deﬁne fair trade standards, not the local people; and 
local fair trade produc6on is not designed for 
domes6c consump6on but for aﬄuent consumers 
abroad who are prepared to pay a premium price to 
feel good about their ethical behavior. The 
unwillingness of fair trade coopera6ves to embed 
themselves into na6onal sustainability strategies has 
become apparent in Costa Rica, a country which 
aspires to be the leader in sustainable banana 
produc6on in tropical countries. In this context, the 
Corporación Bananera Nacional Corbana, S.A. 
(CORBANA), an organiza6on par6ally owned by the 
banana growers of Costa Rica, seeks to get the 
geographical indica6on (GI) accredita6on of ‘Banano 
de Costa Rica’ as a na6onal sustainability label for 
banana produc6on14. As such it collaborates with all 
key stakeholders in the banana business and 
sustainability cer6ﬁca6on. Oddly, fair trade 
coopera6ves are not part of this collabora6on. They 
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argue that they have to follow the instruc6ons 
demanded by the retailers in impor6ng countries. 
4.2  Embeddedness and its link to sustainability and 
corporate responsibility 
The case studies in the previous chapter illustrate 
that the term ‘embeddedness’ also has a strong 
rela6onship to corporate responsibility and 
sustainability. Aher all, a private organiza6on that is 
locally embedded and abides by its self-imposed 
principles of corporate responsibility is more likely to 
assume ac6ve responsibility for the local people and 
their environment and bring prosperity to the region. 
The ISO 26000 Standard on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) as well as the OECD Guidelines 
for Mul6na6onal Enterprises (MNEs) point out that 
mul6na6onal corpora6ons should get involved in 
local community development. ‘Community 
Development and Involvement’ is, in fact, one of the 
priority areas of ISO 26000 and can be interpreted as 
a commitment to local embeddedness. However, the 
wording of the ISO 26000 standard very much 
reﬂects the spirit of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (UNGP) and its focus on 
minimizing poten6al risks of FDI for human rights. In 
accordance with the view of embedded liberalism 
(Ruggie 1982), the common goal of ISO26000, as 
well as UNGP, is to tell MNEs how to become good 
corporate ci6zens by refraining from doing bad 
things to people and the environment while 
contribu6ng to general wellbeing. The narra6ve is 
implicitly s6ll guided by Karl Polanyi’s argument that 
a self-regula6ng market leads to social disrup6on 
and causes disembeddedness of local tradi6onal 
economies. 
5.			Concluding	remarks	
Karl Polanyi’s highly inﬂuen6al book ‘The Great 
Transforma6on’, published in 1944, addressed a lot 
of important concerns related to the global 
expansion of the formal market economy and its 
poten6al to disrupt and disembed tradi6onal 
economic systems. In many ways, he proved to be a 
visionary in an6cipa6on of the increased ability and 
agility of MNE to act beyond exis6ng na6onal 
regulatory regimes in the age of the globaliza6on. 
The view of a global economy dominated by rootless 
MNE that would undermine na6onal solidarity, 
decrease the bargaining power of na6onal 
stakeholders, increase social inequality, and thrive on 
poor working condi6ons in developing countries has 
caused a backlash against economic globaliza6on. 
It is undeniable that economic globaliza6on 
produces winners and losers and that the losers 
need to be not just compensated but also coached in 
their eﬀorts to become re-integrated into economic 
life. But what is exactly the alterna6ve to a modern 
trade-oriented and innova6on-driven market 
economy? History shows that there has never been a 
past, as ohen imagined by the cri6cs of globaliza6on, 
where people lived in harmony with nature, and 
were able to ensure that everyone has enough for a 
produc6ve and fulﬁlling life. The past was instead 
characterized by war-mongering feudalist regimes 
that were dominated by rent-seeking elites that 
oppressed and exploited their subjects for the sake 
of achieving par6cular poli6cal and military goals. 
They mostly competed for land not through trade 
deals but by waging war. These regimes that became 
rich through war rather than trade produced a much 
greater percentage share of losers than today’s trade 
regimes that leave room for social mobility and 
economic empowerment. This probably explains why 
Polanyi does not dis6nguish between empires that 
became rich through trade and those that became 
rich through war. 
Polanyi’s norma6ve view of economic globaliza6on 
as a force of disembeddedness has nevertheless 
become very popular in aﬄuent economies. The line 
of argumenta6on is that MNEs are merely 
disembedding tradi6onal economies in developing 
countries and that therefore development 
coopera6on and philanthropic ac6vi6es need to be 
focused on eﬀorts to compensate or protect these 
embedded tradi6onal economies. This view tends to 
cement exis6ng structures rather than induce 
structural change because these countries need 
economic integra6on, not isola6on to cope with 
popula6on growth and the resul6ng economic, 
social, and environmental challenges. 
Despite their poten6al contribu6on to economic 
integra6on, MNE that invest in fragile developing 
countries may increasingly face reputa6on problems 
because their primary goal is indeed to generate a 
return on investment rather than to provide 
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development assistance to the poor. It is therefore 
quite easy for an6-MNE ac6vists to denounce FDI in 
fragile developing economies as ‘land-grabbing’ or 
‘exploita6on of poor labor and environmental 
standards’. As a consequence, many MNE prefer to 
focus again on domes6c investments in advanced, 
stable economies and divestments in high-risk 
developing economies; even though the poten6al 
posi6ve long-term impact of their investments would 
be lowest in the former, the aﬄuent minority world, 
and greatest in the laber, the struggling majority 
world. In other words, they focus on managing and 
preserving prosperity rather than spreading it. This is 
hardly desirable given the general insight that private 
sector involvement is necessary for the global eﬀort 
to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) by 2030. 
Since knowledge-based MNE are ohen at the core of 
expanding global formal and informal networks 
related to GVCs, they play a crucial role in the 
economic integra6on of less developed regions by 
decreasing the transac6on costs of doing business. 
Local businesses that receive the necessary 
investment to comply with the global standards of 
the respec6ve GVC become suppliers of the foreign 
MNE. As such they automa6cally abract more 
investment, hire more local people and enhance 
local economic opportuni6es for the outsiders in the 
region. As such, MNEs are not merely replacing 
informal transac6ons with formal transac6ons but 
are crea6ng alterna6ve informal and formal 
networks in the region with low transac6on costs. 
These are not replacing tradi6onal economic 
networks but must be conceived as complementary 
to pre-exis6ng ones that are ohen s6ll characterized 
by feudal structures. They increase the choice for 
local people in search of economic opportuni6es and 
may prove more abrac6ve to local people if they 
manage to address the three coordina6on problems 
related to value, compe66on, and coopera6on in an 
eﬀec6ve and fair way. 
MNE address these coordina6on problems by 
involving local social and economic networks in 
deﬁning the terms of reference of market 
interac6on. As a consequence, an MNE that is 
interested in long-term investments in a par6cular 
country will encourage its subsidiary there to engage 
with local stakeholders to learn what they expect 
from the presence of the MNE in their country. If the 
MNE is commibed to ‘principled embeddedness’ in 
the sense that it has many 6es to the local economy 
while simultaneously s6cking to its own corporate 
responsibility principles, it may eventually earn social 
capital in the form of public trust within the region. 
This enhances its freedom to operate and lowers its 
transac6on costs of doing business. In other words, 
‘principled embeddedness’ has nothing to do with 
disembedding ﬁrst local economic structures and 
then compensa6ng for the damage done. Instead it 
is all about beneﬁ6ng the foreign investor as much 
as the local stakeholders. So the foreign investor is 
not disembedding but enhancing the value of the 
locally embedded economy by contribu6ng to its 
diversiﬁca6on, its technological and managerial 
upgrading, and its integra6on into global value 
chains. 
The strategy of ‘principled embeddedness’ of MNE 
and how their subsidiaries concretely implement it 
has been illustrated using four brief but actual case 
descrip6ons in this paper. They all show that such a 
strategy signiﬁcantly contributes to the ﬂourishing of 
the local economy as well as to achieving the UN 
SDGs since their local public-private partnerships do 
not just beneﬁt the MNE and its employees but also 
contribute to poverty reduc6on, beber educa6on, 
improved health, and more economic opportuni6es 
for the local people. 
For sure MNE are no saints and abuses of their 
economic and poli6cal clout in fragile developing 
economies are well-documented. But rather than 
merely focusing on minimizing the poten6al risks of 
foreign FDI, CSR ra6ngs should also award the ‘moral 
courage’ of those MNE that invest in such high-risk 
economies by following a strategy of principled 
embeddedness that enables the local private sector 
to beneﬁt from the knowledge and know-how of 
global networks related to GVCs. 
MNEs that have this moral courage are of crucial 
importance in the spread of prosperity to people 
who are trapped in informal and tradi6onal 
economies that do not generate suﬃcient and 
decent work for a growing young popula6on and are 
 16
ATDF JOURNAL  VOLUME 9, ISSUE 1 2017
dominated by embedded structures that are based 
on rent-seeking patron-client systems that prevent 
economic empowerment. This makes their 
embedded foreign direct investment more valuable 
in eﬀorts to achieve the UN SDGs than the widely 
communicated corporate social responsibility 
ac6vi6es and are now being linked to numerous 
SDGs. 
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